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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence of driving under the 
influence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On December 29, 2007, City of Sandpoint police officer Derrick Hagstrom initiated a 
traffic stop of Matthew Gilbert Scott (Scott). (Tr., p. 3, L. 15 - p. 4, L. 2.) Officer Hagstrom 
was on patrol and had stopped at a stop sign behind Scott just after Scott had pulled away from 
the same stop sign. (Tr., p. 4, L. 12; L. 15-23.) After Scott pulled away from the stop sign, 
Officer Hagstrom remained stationary at the stop sign and observed Scott accelerate to 32 miles 
per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. (Tr., p. 4, L. 22 - p. 5, L. 2; p. 11, Ls. 21-22.) Scott was 
inside the city limits of Sandpoint when Officer Hagstrom observed this traffic violation. (Tr., p. 
6, Ls. 17-19.) Scott was travelling west on Pine Street and was in the Fifteen-hundred block of 
Pine Street at the time of the speeding violation. (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 15-16; p. 6, Ls. 19-21.) At 
hearing, Officer Hagstrom gave inconsistent estimates of the distance fiom the location of the 
speeding violation to the edge of city limits. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 19-24.; p. 13, Ls. 17-19.) After 
observing the speeding violation, Officer Hagstrom attempted to catch up to Scott. (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 
12-14.) It was snowing heavily at the time and there was approximately four inches of snow on 
the ground. (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-15.) Both vehicles were outside city limits before Officer 
Hagstrom activated his overhead lights. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-7.) At hearing, Scott estimated that 
Officer Hagstrom was about one mile outside of city limits at the time of the stop. (Tr., p. 18, 
Ls. 14-19). 
As a result of the stop Scott was charged with misdemeanor DUI, second offense. (R., p. 
20.) Scott moved to suppress the evidence against him. (R., p. 37.) After hearing, the 
magistrate court concluded that when Officer Hagstrom exited city limits he was not in fresh 
pursuit of Scott, and therefore did not have la*l authority to stop Scott. (R., pp. 48-49.) 
The state appealed the magistrate's order to district court. (R., pp. 50-51.) The district 
court affirmed the magistrate's order. (R., pp. 79-88.) The state now appeals to this court. (R., 
pp. 89-92.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did The Magistrate Court Err When It Concluded That Officer Hagstrom Was Not In 
Fresh Pursuit Of Scott? 
2. Is Suppression The Appropriate Remedy For Officer Hagstrom's Illegal Stop Of Scott? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The Magistrate Court Was Correct In Concludina That Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh 
Pursuit Of Scott When He Left His Territorial Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
It is not in dispute that Officer Hagstrom initiated and conducted his traffic stop of Scott 
outside of the city limits of Sandpoint, Officer Hagstrom's territorial jurisdiction. Under some 
circumstances this would be allowed. The state contends that the fresh pursuit exception should 
apply in this case. The trial court, however, concluded that Officer Hagstrom was not in fresh 
pursuit of Scott and that Officer Hagstrom had "ample opportunity" to initiate a traffic stop 
inside Sandpoint city limits. This court should not disturb the Magistrate's factual conclusion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by 
substantial evidence are accepted, but the appellate court freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 91 6 P.2d 
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. 
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,789,979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, the 
appellate court reviews the decision of the district court directly. State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 709, 
71 1, 184 P.3d 21 5, 21 7 (Ct. App. 2008). The reviewing court examines the magistrate record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id 
If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court 
affirmed the magistrate's decision, the district court's decision is affirmed as a matter of 
procedure. Id. 
C. Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh Pursuit As Defined By Idaho Statute 
Police officers of the State of Idaho are generally not allowed to operate outside the 
territorial area of their employing city or political subdivision. Idaho Code 67-2337(2): 
All authority that applies to peace officers when performing their assigned 
functions and duties within the territorial limits of the respective city or political 
subdivisions, where they are employed, shall apply to them outside such territorial 
limits to the same degree and extent only when any one (1) of the following 
conditions exist: 
(a) A request for law enforcement assistance is made by a law enforcement 
agency of said jurisdiction. 
(b) The peace officer possesses probable cause to believe a crime is occurring 
involving a felony or an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to any 
person. 
(c) When a peace officer is in fresh pursuit as defined in and pursuant to chapter 
7, title 19, Idaho Code. 
(emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that either subsections (a) or (b) 
apply in this case. "Fresh pursuit" is the only possible justification for Officer Hagstrom 
conducting a traffic stop outside of Sandpoint. Idaho Code 50-209 would also provide a fresh 
pursuit exception to Officer Hagstrom: 
The policemen of every city, should any be appointed, shall have power to arrest 
all offenders against the law of the state, or of the city, by day or by night, in the 
same manner as the sheriff or constable. Whenever such policemen shall be in 
fresh pursuit of any offender against any law of the state, including traffic 
infractions, or of the city and the offense has been committed within the corporate 
limits of such city, such policemen, while in such fresh pursuit may go beyond the 
corporate or geographical limits of such city subject to the provisions of chapter 7, 
title 19, Idaho Code, for the purpose of making such arrest or citation. 
Fresh pursuit is authorized in Idaho Code 19-701A: 
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably 
believed by him to have committed a felony in this state or has committed, or 
attempted to commit, any criminal offense or traffic infraction in this state in the 
presence of such officer, or for whom a warrant of arrest is outstanding for a 
criminal offense, shall have authority to pursue, arrest and hold in custody or cite 
such person anywhere in this state. 
Idaho Code 19-705 defines "fresh pursuityy: 
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in this act shall include fresh pursuit as defined 
by the common law1, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony 
or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include 
the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though 
no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing 
that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not 
necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay. 
The above statutes, read together, stand for the common-sense proposition that if a law 
enforcement officer, while attempting to seize a law-breaker, happens to follow the law-breaker 
across a geographic boundary, the officer has authority to arrest wherever it is the two arrive. 
These statutes are relatively straightforward and the Respondent is not going to invite any 
statutory interpretation. 
This exception simply does not come into play in this case. Officer Hagstrom's attention 
was drawn to Scott because of a speeding violation. Thereafter, Officer Hagstrom followed and 
observed Scott, eventually leaving the City of Sandpoint. The magistrate court is the finder of 
fact. The court receives testimony in person and has an opportunity to personally observe the 
credibility of witnesses. During testimony, Officer Hagstrom indicated on an exhibit the 
approximate locations of relevant occurrences. (Tr., p. 12, L. 19 - p. 13, L. 24.) Officer 
Hagstrom first testified on direct that Scott was as close as "an eighth of a mile probably"2 to the 
edge of city limits. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 23-24.) He also testified that the distance was several hundred 
1 As argued below, common law fiesh pursuit is not an issue in this case. 
One eighth of a mile equals 660 feet. 
yards. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 21-23.) Later, on redirect, Officer Hagstrom agreed that there are several 
businesses and "other entities" between the point where Scott committed the speeding violation 
and a train bridge previously identified as the approximate location of city limits. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 
23 - p. 12., L. 1; p. 13, Ls. 9-1 3.) Officer Hagstrom identified the businesses and other entities 
as "three apartment complexes.. . a substation, athletic club, city park, and a school." (Tr., p. 13, 
Ls. 14-16.) Officer Hagstrom agreed that it was a "significant distance" between the location of 
the speeding violation and city limits. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 17-19.) The magistrate received this 
somewhat conflicting information and made a factual determination as to the distance and length 
of time that Officer Hagstrom followed Scott while inside Sandpoint city limits. The magistrate 
concluded that there was "ample opportunity" for Officer Hagstrom to activate his overhead 
lights while he and Scott were within the city limits of Sandpoint. (R., p. 48.) The state has 
argued that the "touchstone of 'fresh pursuit' is 'pursuit without unreasonable delay."' 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) That may be so, but it is beside the point. The magistrate concluded in 
this case that there was unreasonable delay in Officer Hagstrom's pursuit of Scott. 
D. Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh Pursuit As Defined By Common Law 
Common law fresh pursuit is not an issue in this case. It is not necessary to repeat the 
above argument. Common law fresh pursuit, as applied to the facts of this case, is either 
narrower or coextensive with the statutory definition. Of the four cases cited by the state that 
interpret fresh pursuit, two are interpreting similarly worded state statutes. The two others are 
Poss v. State and State v. Nysus. 
In Poss v. State, the Georgia court alludes to a common law rule of "hot pursuit,"3 but the 
rule is not defined in the opinion or in any of the cases cited by the opinion. Poss v. State, 167 
There is overlap in the use of the terms "hot pursuit" and "fkesh pursuit" and it appears that the two are sometimes 
used interchangeably. Whether there is a substantive difference is, fortunately, not an issue to decide in this case. 
7 
Ga.App. 86, 87, 305 S.E.2d 884, 885 (Ga. App. 1983). About the rule, whatever it might 
specifically say, the court stated that hot pursuit is characterized by "continuity and immediacy." 
Id at 88, 886. This is similar to Idaho's statutory requirement of "pursuit without unreasonable 
delay." I.C. 19-705. 
In State v. Nysus, the New Mexico court recited a definition for fresh pursuit: "[tlhe 
common law doctrine of fresh pursuit allows a peace officer to arrest beyond the boundaries of 
his jurisdiction only in pursuit of a person believed to have committed a felony." State v. Nysus, 
131 N.M. 338, 343, 35 P. 3d 993, 998 (N.M. App. 2001) (citing Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 
463, 466, 553 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1976)). At all times prior to the stop, Scott was being 
investigated for violation of a traffic infraction, much less a misdemeanor or felony. The 
common law rule of fresh pursuit, as articulated by the courts of New Mexico, requires the 
officer to be investigating a felony and as such does not apply to this case. 
Suppression Is The Appropriate Remedy For Officer Hagstrom's Illegal Stop Of Scott 
A. Introduction 
The state argues in the alternative that if Officer Hagstrom's stop of Scott was violative of 
Idaho law, that suppression is not an appropriate remedy. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bihcated. When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial 
evidence are accepted, but the appellate court freely reviews the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
C. The Issue Was Not Properly Preserved For Appeal 
At hearing and during intermediate appeal the state did not argue against suppression as 
an appropriate remedy in this case. It is well settled that in general, issues not raised below may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 
1155 (Ct. App. 1998). The magistrate court did not specifically explore whether Scott's 
constitutional rights were violated because the state did not raise it as an issue. The argument is 
therefore waived and should not be considered by this Court. 
D. Officer Hagstrom's Stop Of Scott Was A Seizure Not Authorized Under Idaho Law And 
Suppression Is Therefore The Appropriate Remedy 
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 5 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution protect citizens fiom unreasonable search and seizure. "Stopping an automobile 
and detaining its occupants will be deemed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 'even though 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. "' State v. Simpson, 1 12 
Idaho 644, 645, 734 P.2d 669, 670 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653,99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 (1979)). Evidence obtained by searches and seizures made in 
violation of this constitutional right is inadmissible against the accused. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectuate the rights 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment by deterring law enforcement officials fiom violating 
constitutional protections. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492,96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051 (1976); State 
v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 558,21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct.App.2001). Because the exclusionary rule 
imposes a price upon society that can enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary 
rule is only applicable if there is a causal connection between the police misconduct and the 
acquisition of the challenged evidence. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 
3380, 3385-86 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18 
(1963); State v. Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 918, 174 P.3d 885, 888 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Babb, 136 
Idaho 95,98,29 P.3d 406,409 (Ct.App.2001). 
The nexus between constitutional violation and seized evidence exists in this case. 
Directly at issue is Officer Hagstrom's authority to seize and detain Scott. All of the evidence 
gathered against Scott necessarily comes from the traffic stop. 
Peace officers may exercise authority outside the territorial limits of the city where they 
are employed "only when any of any one (1) of the following conditions exist: ... (c) [fresh 
pursuit." I.C. 5 67-2337(2). In this case, absent fresh pursuit, Officer Hagstrom is lacking 
authority to stop Scott. 
The state cites State v. BeneJiel for the proposition that suppression is not an appropriate 
remedy for a traffic stop conducted by an officer outside his territorial jurisdiction. BeneJiel 
contains no discussion whatsoever about the legal authority of the officer that conducted the 
extra-territorial stop. State v. BeneJiel, 131 Idaho 226, 228-229, 953 P.2d 976, 979-980 (1998). 
In other words, the court's opinion did not find a violation, statutory or otherwise, and then go on 
to conclude that suppression was not the appropriate remedy. To the contrary, the court 
specifically found that the officer in BeneJiel was acting within his lawful authority as a police 
officer. Id. BeneJiel is distinguishable because it is absent in factual content similar to this case 
and opposite in conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's appellate 
decision affirming the magistrate's suppression order. 
Dated this 2nd day of July 201 0. 
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